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Planning Disaster 
PRICE GOUGING STATUTES AND  
THE SHORTAGES THEY CREATE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early months of 2005, the world was still reeling 
from the massive tsunami which devastated large stretches of 
eastern Asia, killed more than 200,000, and rendered millions 
more homeless.1  Later that same year, a devastating 7.6 
magnitude earthquake struck Pakistan, killing at least 87,000 
people—and left three million to face winter in the Himalayan 
foothills without adequate shelter.2  Domestically, residents of 
the gulf coast faced three immense hurricanes in the most 
active hurricane season on record.3  Katrina, the most 
destructive, inundated New Orleans, damaged property and 
displaced residents throughout Louisiana and Mississippi.4 
Natural disasters are unavoidable, but enlightened 
policies directing our response to them can have a critical 
impact in easing their costs.  Desperate situations often 
dramatically illustrate the best in human nature, yet 
unfortunately they also sometimes show us at our very worst.  
Usually relegated to the latter category are those accused of 
“price gouging,”5 the accusation that suppliers of goods take 
advantage of the victims of disaster and, knowing their need, 
charge excessively high prices, understanding that their 
customers have no choice but to meet their demands.  The 
culmination of this distaste can be found in a number of state 
laws criminalizing the practice, notably in many of the gulf 
  
 1 Carol J. Williams & Maggie Farley, Disasters Taxing Aid Capacity, U.N. 
Says; In Pakistan, Relief Efforts Shift from Rescue to Providing Supplies for Isolated 
Quake Victims, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2005, at A1. 
 2 Earthquake at a Glance, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 24, 2005, at 6A. 
 3 Ken Kaye, Biggest, Costliest Hurricane Season Yet, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 2005, at A1. 
 4 After the Flood; Hurricane Katrina, ECONOMIST, Sep. 3, 2005. 
 5 The term “gouging,” much like the term “murder,” has certain negative 
connotations, so I will attempt to use the phrase sparingly.  
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states,6 as well as in calls by members of Congress to institute 
federal price gouging laws.7   
It is not contradictory to hope and expect that fellow 
citizens will aid each other in their time of need and still argue 
that implementing price ceilings is likely to have no better 
effect than to prolong that need.  This Note argues that price 
gouging laws, though aimed at correcting a widely perceived ill, 
actually exacerbate shortages of emergency goods following 
disasters, when want is greatest.  This Note recommends the 
repeal of state price gouging laws and, recognizing the 
potential difficulties state legislators might face in doing so, 
proposes a system of federal emergency relief that is, in part, 
more responsive to the price mechanism.  Such a system would 
have the benefits of signaling need more accurately, would 
encourage states to abandon artificial price ceilings, and would 
provide competitive incentives for sellers to restrain price 
levels.   
Part II of this Note briefly describes some of the 
historical, ethical, and religious prohibitions against price 
gouging that demonstrate the longstanding antipathy towards 
the practice.  This section also examines how these 
longstanding moral concerns with “fair” prices have survived in 
modern law, primarily in the form of antitrust laws and price 
gouging statutes.  This section will also distinguish price 
gouging from antitrust laws and will describe how the antitrust 
laws already prohibit the most damaging behavior 
contemplated by price gouging statutes.  Part III examines the 
economic effects of price gouging statutes, such as the 
exacerbation of shortages and the misallocative effects of 
artificially low prices.  This section will also discuss some of the 
benefits of supporting a free market following a disaster, 
including the increased likelihood of storing necessary goods 
before a disaster, as well as the greater likelihood that 
necessary goods will be transferred to the disaster area by 
private, self-interested actors seeking to take advantage of 
higher prices.  Finally, Part IV of this Note concludes by 
arguing that the most sensible way to avoid the harms of price 
  
 6 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-301 to -305 (LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 501.160 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:732 (West 2005). 
 7 See Press Release, U.S. Sen. Ken Salazar, Sen. Salazar Targets Super-SUV 
Gas Guzzling Loophole & Gas Price Gouging (Oct. 9, 2005), available at 
http://salazar.senate.gov/news/releases/051009gasprc.htm; see also Treat Emergency 
Victims Fairly Act of 2005, S. 1854, 109th Cong. (2005).  
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ceilings is for states to repeal their harmful price gouging 
legislation.  In conjunction with such action, this Note also 
recommends as a possible solution that the federal government 
direct extra relief aid to areas where the price mechanism 
suggests it is most in need.  This last point draws upon the 
economic and legal arguments presented in opposition to 
current price gouging statutes to support a program that could 
result in a more efficient and effective post-disaster recovery. 
II. BACKGROUND OF PRICE GOUGING STATUTES 
Sellers who charge higher prices for goods that are in 
short supply after a disaster face what sometimes seems like 
almost universal condemnation.8  The best evidence of popular 
distaste for the practice is perhaps found in the pejorative 
name: “price gouging.”  As a verb, “gouge” can rarely have a 
positive connotation.9  Intrinsic in the term is the suggestion 
that, by selling the desired goods at a higher than usual price, 
the seller unnecessarily and unfairly harms the buyer; 
essentially, that the seller is not playing fair.  The idea that 
sellers should deal fairly with their customers is hardly a new 
one; indeed, notions of fair dealing in the marketplace underlie 
some of the world’s earliest law.10 
  
 8 In the days following Katrina, gas prices spiked in states located far from 
the eye of the storm, leading to calls for price gouging legislation. For example, both of 
Oregon’s senators independently introduced bills to prohibit perceived price gouging, 
the governor of Oregon joined seven other governors in demanding a congressional 
investigation into possible post-disaster price gouging, and Oregon state legislators 
urged the governor to call a special legislative session to pass a state anti-gouging bill.  
Editorial, Gouging Consumers at the Gas Pump, OREGONIAN, Sept. 22, 2005, at D10; 
see also H.R. Res. 238, 107th Cong. (2001)  (passing a resolution condemning price 
gouging in the wake of the September 11th attacks and urging “the appropriate 
Federal and State agencies to investigate any incidents of price gouging with respect to 
motor fuels during the hours and days after the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, 
and to prosecute any violations of law discovered as a result of the investigations”). 
 9 Among the literal meanings of the term is “to force out the eye of a person 
with one’s thumb.”  AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 600 (4th ed. 2002).  By 
comparison, the definition of “extort” is tame.  Id. at 629 (“To obtain from another 
through coercion or intimidation.”). 
 10 Hon. Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl, Acquiring an Historical 
Understanding of Duties to Disclose, Fraud, and Warranties, 104 COM. L.J. 168, 170 
(1999). 
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A. History of the Fair Price  
From ancient times, societies have enacted systematic 
rules imposing a duty on merchants to sell in good faith.11  
Though evidence exists of such rules among the Babylonians, 
Mesopotamians, Assyrians, and Egyptians, it was in Hebrew 
culture that strong concepts of fair dealing were first strictly 
enforced as essential ethical tenets.12  The Hebrew Talmud, for 
example, provides that “if thou sell [ought] unto your 
neighbour, or buyest ought of thy neighbour’s hand, ye shall 
not oppress one another.”13  Talmudic scholars interpreted this 
verse to prohibit overcharges and undercharges,14 and ruled 
that in any transaction in which the  profit exceeded one-sixth, 
the transaction would be null and void.15  Jewish law was 
skeptical that self-regulating markets could ensure fair prices, 
and accordingly intervened to adjust prices that, at least in 
legal terms, it deemed “unfair.”16  Aspects of Jewish law, at 
least those touching on good faith dealing and full disclosure, 
found their way into Roman law, where they had a significant 
influence on Roman jurists,17 and consequently, on the Civil 
Code countries of France, Germany, and others.18   
The major Western religious traditions also address the 
issue of “fair” prices.  The Catechism of the Catholic Church 
prohibits merchants from making pricing decisions that take 
unfair advantage of those in need.19  Essentially the same 
  
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Leviticus 25:14. 
 14 Hershey H. Friedman, Biblical Foundations of Business Ethics, 3 J. 
MARKETS & MORALITY 43, 48 (2000). 
 15 Id. at 49 (citing the Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia, 50b).  Interestingly, 
Talmudic scholars seemed to have a relatively sophisticated understanding of the 
workings of the law of supply and demand.  Professor Friedman relates the story of 
Shmuel, the Talmudic sage, who was concerned with sellers raising the prices of myrtle 
branches prior to Sukkot.  Id.  He warned the myrtle branch merchants that unless 
they maintained stable prices, he would allow holiday observers to use myrtle branches 
with broken tips.  Id. (citing Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah, 34b).  Clearly Shmuel 
understood the role of increased supply as a moderating influence on price. 
 16 MEIR TAMARI, “WITH ALL YOUR POSSESSIONS”: JEWISH ETHICS AND 
ECONOMIC LIFE 87, 87-88 (1987). 
 17 Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 10, at 170-71.  
 18 Saul Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1651-55 (1997). 
 19 Catechism of the Catholic Church, pt. 3, § 2, ch. 2, art. 7, available at 
http://www.usccb.org/catechism/text/pt3sect2chpt2art7.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) 
(“Even if it does not contradict the provisions of civil law, any form of unjustly taking 
and keeping the property of others is against the seventh commandment: thus, 
deliberate retention of goods lent or of objects lost; business fraud; paying unjust 
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prohibition found its way into the secular norms of early 
European markets, where merchants and their customers 
believed that there was indeed an intrinsically fair price which 
could be objectively determined.20  Market actors believed that 
the sin of unfair pricing could best be avoided by trading in an 
open, transparent market.21  Similarly, Islamic law prohibits 
both Bay’ al-mudtarr, the exploitation of need by, for example, 
charging an exorbitantly high price,22 and Ihtikar, which is 
hoarding, or withholding supplies of essential goods and 
services with a view to raising prices.23 
Hoarding, or otherwise restricting supply to increase 
prices, was understandably repugnant, and in the context of 
antitrust law, is still a criminal act today.24  Recognizing the 
deeply rooted sense of unfairness associated with restricting 
the supply of goods with the aim of raising prices, 
commentators have imagined a situation where “a man owned 
one-half of the wheat in the country and announced his 
intention to burn it, such abuse of ownership would not be 
permitted.  The crowd would kill him sooner than stand it.”25  
Of course, shortages that follow a disaster are not comparable 
to purposeful destruction by a monopolist of his own property, 
but the statement does reflect a strong moral conviction that 
social obligations exist which trump private property rights.   
Common to each of these religious or ethical mandates 
is the idea that the merchant must deal fairly with buyers and 
that he must be prohibited from unjustly forcing up prices to 
  
wages; forcing up prices by taking advantage of the ignorance or hardship of another.”); 
see also Deuteronomy 25:13-16. 
 20 EDWARD CAHILL, FRAMEWORK OF A CHRISTIAN STATE 43 (1930) (“According 
to medieval teaching on the other hand, the price of a commodity was supposed to be 
determined by objective value alone; and could not be justly influenced by the special 
need or ignorance of buyer or seller.”). 
 21 JEAN FAVIER, GOLD & SPICES: THE RISE OF COMMERCE IN THE MIDDLE 
AGES 103 (Caroline Higgitt trans., 1998) (“[T]o the medieval mind, price 
gouging . . . [was a] sin of greed, which was to be warded off by trading in an open 
market, observable by all.”). 
 22 Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Lecture to the UCLA Int’l Inst., Islamic 
Banking and Finance (Fall 2001) (transcript available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/ 
article.asp?parentid=15056). 
 23 MISHKAT, book xii, ch. viii. (“Those who bring grain to a city to sell at a 
cheap rate are blessed, and they who keep it back in order to sell at a high rate are 
cursed.”). 
 24 See infra Part II.B.  The assumption is that in order for a firm to 
successfully restrict output and raise prices, there must either be collusion or some 
other barrier that restricts market entry. 
 25 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 280 (Harcourt, 
Brace and Co. 1920).  
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derive an advantage at the expense of the buyer.  Central to 
the logic of the discussion is that there is indeed some price 
which is objectively “fair” and reflects the true value of the good 
in question.  The general rule at common law has long been 
that the courts should avoid questioning the propriety of prices 
upon which parties agree, except in cases where prices are so 
disparate with value that they suggest the perpetration of a 
fraud.26  On the other hand, as the cases since Lochner27 
suggest, the state has long had the power to interfere with 
private contract rights in support of social welfare.28  In 
unraveling the tension between the right of parties to 
determine prices in the marketplace and the social obligations 
of those parties, a useful place to start is with an examination 
of the antitrust laws.  Not only are the antitrust laws some of 
the oldest and most firmly established consumer protection 
legislation,29 but the cases interpreting the act are valuable for 
the light they shed on such notions as what constitutes a “fair” 
price.30 
B. Antitrust Laws 
The Sherman Antitrust Act codified at the federal level 
much of the judge-made and state law that had begun to 
develop in response to the monopolies of the late 19th century.31  
The rapid industrialization of the period required a new 
corporate form, one which would allow the new industrialists to 
  
 26 See 2 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.15 (Joseph M. Perillo 
& Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender eds., 1995). 
 27 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1905) (holding that a New York 
statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week interfered with the 
freedom of contract, and therefore the right to liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment), abrogated by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392-93 (1937). 
 28 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160 pmbl. (West 2005) (“[C]ontrol over 
pricing of these commodities represents a permissible power of the state . . . .”).  
 29 See generally Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman 
Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (describing the legislative history of the Sherman Act and 
arguing that it displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumer 
welfare).  
 30 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979) (“The essence 
of the antitrust laws is to ensure fair price competition in an open market.”).  There is 
no evidence in the antitrust jurisprudence that antitrust analysis contemplates an 
objectively “fair” price. 
 31 See 21 CONG. REC. S2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (noting that 
the proposed Act was meant to “supplement the enforcement of the established rules of 
the common and statute law by the courts of the several states”).  
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limit liabilities and to pool capital on an unprecedented scale.32  
It is no coincidence that the new corporate form grew in 
popularity along with capital intensive industries such as the 
new railroads.33  The new capital markets were, if anything, too 
good at their job, providing more than ample capital for new 
industry and in some cases leading to over-investment.34  
Despite the extraordinary costs of railroad construction,35 both 
the number of railroads and the territory they covered 
exploded.36  Competing railroads soon found themselves 
engaged in ruinous price-cutting wars as they struggled to 
attract a volume of business sufficient to make their ventures 
profitable.37  Recognizing the harm of this competition to 
potential profits, the railroad operators formed pools or cartels 
to control output and prices.38 
In contrast to the cartels of the day which limited 
competition in order to enable increases in price, most people in 
the late nineteenth century came to believe that it was free 
competition that was essential to a healthy economy.39  
Through vigorous competition, the most efficient producers 
naturally rose to the top, and attempts to interfere with the 
workings of competitive markets by imposing artificial 
restraints would only hinder progress.40  Cartels were, of 
course, anathema to the idea of competition, and as the public 
  
 32 Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the 
Large Corporation, 1875-1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 637-41 (1978). 
 33 Christian C. Day, Investor Power & Liquidity: Corporations, Capital 
Markets and the Industrialization of America, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 345, 376 
(2001) (noting that the “emergence of capital markets neatly coincided with the 
voracious demands of capital-intensive railroads”). 
 34 See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW (2002) 
(relating stories of rampant speculation, imprudent overinvestment, and shockingly 
generous government largesse). 
 35 In the early days of the industry, costs ran as high as $36,000 a mile, at a 
time when $1000 was a solid middle-class income. See JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN 
EMPIRE OF WEALTH 149 (2004). 
 36 Id. at 235 (noting that between 1860 and 1900 the number of miles of track 
laid increased six-fold and that by the turn of the century “nearly every town of any 
size was served by a railroad”). 
 37 For a discussion on the railroad price wars preceding the Sherman Act, see 
generally Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ 
Costs”: The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1, 28-30 (1996). 
 38 ELEANOR M. FOX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON U.S. ANTITRUST IN 
GLOBAL CONTEXT 4-5 (2d ed. 1989) (describing cartels as “horizontal, loosely structured 
combinations of competitors that joined forces to create large, regionally dominant 
systems”). 
 39 SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE: A STUDY 
OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901, at 289 (1956). 
 40 Id. 
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grew increasingly concerned with the power of these new 
combinations41 ameliorative legislation became inevitable.42    
In response, Senator John Sherman introduced the 
Sherman Antitrust Act43 in 1889, which was ultimately passed 
by Congress on July 2, 1890.44  Though the question of the 
precise meaning of a prohibition on any “restraint of trade” has 
been debated ever since,45 it is fairly clear that Congress had in 
mind a fairly precise meaning for the term “monopoly.”46  The 
Act protected, more than anything, the right of producers to 
compete on their merits, and, in turn, the right of consumers to 
enjoy the lower prices that must result from that competition.47  
The legislative history surrounding the Act indicates 
congressional concern for both the welfare of the consumers 
and the protection of small businesses—values that some have 
argued must at times inevitably come into conflict.48  What is 
clear is that the Sherman Antitrust Act reflected a legislative 
determination that when businesses combine in such a way as 
to reduce competition, consumers suffer, and legislative bodies 
  
 41 Public concern over the increasingly concentrated power of the trusts and 
cartels of the day was no doubt fueled by statements such as this by James B. Dill to 
the famous muckraking journalist Lincoln Steffens: “Trusts are natural, inevitable 
growths out of our social and economic conditions. . . . You cannot stop them by force, 
with laws.  They will sweep down like glaciers upon your police, courts, and States, and 
wash them into flowing rivers.”  LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LINCOLN 
STEFFENS 196 (Heyday Books 2005) (1931). 
 42 Id. 
 43 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000). 
 44 FOX ET AL., supra note 38, at 11. 
 45 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278-302 (6th 
Cir. 1898) (collecting cases defining “restraint of trade” at common law), modified and 
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 46 In the legislative debates, questions as to what constituted a monopoly 
appeared to be resolved in a manner consistent with the common law understanding of 
the term.  For example, Senator George Hoar expressed that he and members of the 
committee agreed that the term “‘monopoly’ is a merely technical term which has a 
clear and legal signification, and it is this: It is the sole engrossing to a man’s self by 
means which prevent other men from engaging in fair competition with him.” 21 CONG. 
REC. 3, 152 (1890).  It was equally clear to them what it is not: “a man who merely by 
superior skill and intelligence . . . got the whole business because nobody could do it as 
well as he could was not a monopolist.”  Id.  This distinction has remained an 
important part of antitrust law since. 
 47 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 20 (1993) (quoting an early draft of the Sherman Antitrust Act which would 
have outlawed arrangements “designed, or which tend, to advance the cost to the 
consumer”). 
 48 See id. at 50-53 (arguing that a policy which protects smaller but less 
efficient producers will always have the effect of raising prices, to the detriment of 
consumers). 
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have both a right and duty to intercede on behalf of those 
vulnerable consumers.49 
What the Sherman Act does not guarantee, and was 
never intended to guarantee, is a particular price for 
consumers.50  Often times when charged with a violation of the 
antitrust laws, defendants would argue that their conduct 
should fall outside the scope of the Sherman Act prohibitions 
because the price the alleged cartel charged was “reasonable.”51  
In the landmark case Addyston Pipe & Steel,52 the government 
accused six cast-iron pipe manufacturers of agreeing to fix 
prices, in part, by dividing sales regions amongst themselves.53  
The manufacturers argued that the common law upon which 
the Sherman Act was based imposed nothing more than a 
“reasonable-price” test.54  Future President and Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court William Howard Taft, at the time a judge 
on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected that argument 
altogether, holding that under either the common law or the 
new statute, the defendants’ behavior violated the law.55   
Taft’s opinion is important in that it implicitly rejected 
the notion that courts can or should utilize a reasonable price 
standard, noting that “the manifest danger in the 
administration of justice according to so shifting, vague, and 
indeterminate a standard would seem to be a strong reason 
against adopting it.”56  Allowing courts to arbitrarily decide 
whether a particular naked restraint of competition was 
damaging or not was to “set sail on a sea of doubt,” since it 
  
 49 Id. 
 50 Or at least any price other than the competitive price. 
 51 See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 279 (6th Cir. 
1898), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 52 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 271.  Defendants appealed the judgment against 
them to the Supreme Court.  See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 
211, 211 (1899).  The lower court’s opinion was upheld, with Justice Peckham’s decision 
quoting from Judge Taft’s lower court opinion approvingly.  Id. at 226, 248. 
 53 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 291-93. 
 54 Id. at 279. 
 55 Id. at 291 (“Upon this review of the law and the authorities, we can have 
no doubt that the association of the defendants, however reasonable the prices they 
fixed, however great the competition they had to encounter, and however great the 
necessity for curbing themselves by joint agreement from committing financial suicide 
by ill-advised competition, was void at common law, because in restraint of trade, and 
tending toward a monopoly.”). 
 56 Id. at 284. 
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would be nearly impossible for the courts to set any reasonable 
standard of what measure of protection parties required.57 
It is no cause for wonder that the Court was skeptical of 
a monopolist’s desire or ability to charge only a fair or 
reasonable price, and accordingly that the Court was unwilling 
to consider whether a monopolist’s price was objectively fair.58  
What is truly remarkable is that the antitrust laws prohibit 
fixing maximum prices as well.59  The Supreme Court has held 
that:  
Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in 
an unlawful activity.  Even though the members of the price-fixing 
group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that 
they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly 
interfering with the free play of market forces.60   
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,61 the Court 
specifically rejected the defense that setting a maximum price 
sellers could charge for a service could only help consumers.62  
The clear import of the Court’s reasoning in these cases is that 
the antitrust laws do not necessarily guarantee low prices, only 
the conditions that could lead to them.63   
Antitrust law has undoubtedly worked to maintain 
competition and consequently, to enhance consumer welfare.64  
As is made clear by antitrust jurisprudence, however, the 
Supreme Court has long recognized that the workings of a 
liberal market are better able to allocate goods to consumers at 
  
 57 Id. at 283-84 (commenting that there existed “no measure of what is 
necessary to the protection of either party, except the vague and varying opinion of 
judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, men ought to be allowed to 
restrain competition”). 
 58 A monopolist, like a competitive firm, seeks to maximize profits.  The 
monopolist accomplishes this through setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost.  
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 343 (2d ed. 1997). 
 59 Given that the primary policy of antitrust law is to protect consumers 
through ensuring that producers charge fair (usually understood to mean low) prices, 
see BORK, supra note 47, it is notable that the Supreme Court also considers 
agreements that fix maximum prices to be in violation of the Sherman Act. 
 60 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).  Socony-
Vacuum reaffirms the principle first laid down in Addyston Pipe that the purported 
reasonableness of prices is of no moment in determining whether an agreement 
violates the law.  Id. 
 61 Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
 62 Id. at 349. 
 63 Id. at 347 (“We have not wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule 
against price fixing.”). 
 64 RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 14 (2d ed. 2001). 
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the “fair” price.65  Prices are really nothing more than a 
snapshot, a fleeting impression of all the relevant factors in one 
moment that inform buyers’ and sellers’ market decisions at 
that time.66  The Court recognized the futility, and indeed the 
potential harm, of arbitrarily fixing prices: “The reasonableness 
of prices has no constancy due to the dynamic quality of 
business facts underlying price structures.  Those who fixed 
reasonable prices today would perpetuate unreasonable prices 
tomorrow, since those prices would not be subject to continuous 
administrative supervision and readjustment in light of 
changed conditions.”67  This is not to say that antitrust law does 
not or should not play a role in a post-disaster market—it can 
and does.68  It is simply important to note that, in the world of 
antitrust at least, the Court has recognized and reaffirmed the 
idea that consumer welfare is best served by allowing markets 
to operate unencumbered by “the vague and varying opinion” of 
judges and well-meaning legislators.69 
Antitrust laws are already well equipped to address the 
genuinely manipulative behavior that price gouging statutes 
purport to address.  But the justification that supports 
interventions in antitrust cases, the creation of artificial 
scarcity by reducing output, does not hold with the same force 
in situations of natural scarcity.  Holmes imagined the hostile 
public reaction that would no doubt result should a monopolist 
decide to burn half of his crop with a view to raising prices.70  
Antitrust laws address the root of the problem, by preventing 
the formation or maintenance of monopolies through 
anticompetitive acts from the outset.71  Holmes’s thought 
experiment would take on an entirely different dimension had 
he asked how the public should react were it instead a wildfire 
  
 65 Id. at 24. 
 66 See STIGLITZ, supra note 58, at 72-73. 
 67 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). 
 68 Incidentally, the federal government might conceivably have some power 
to regulate price gouging through the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price 
discrimination.  
 69 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283-84 (6th Cir. 
1898), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 70 See supra Section II.A. 
 71 Recall that monopolies that grow out of the superior skill or efficiency of a 
producer are not the target of antitrust law.  It is said that U.S. antitrust law has a 
favorite epithet: Antitrust law protects competition and consumers, not competitors; it 
is not a proscription against unfairness.  See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).  It seems quite likely that a producer, whether a 
monopolist or not, could not long maintain their dominant position by destroying half 
their crop. 
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that destroyed half the wheat crop.72  Absent some act of 
negligence, it would hardly be fair to lay the blame on the 
producer.  Scarcely better from a moral standpoint, and 
certainly worse for everyone who needs wheat, is to address the 
problem by instituting a price ceiling on the product demanded, 
thereby exacerbating the shortage.73  Yet this is precisely what 
modern price gouging statutes tend to do.  
C. Modern Price Gouging Statutes 
Like the cases interpreting the Sherman Act, price 
gouging statutes often explicitly recognize the superiority of 
the marketplace in pricing consumer goods.74  Nonetheless, 
citing the extraordinary impacts of disasters on the workings of 
the market system, many state legislatures reasoned that the 
public interest required laws to protect consumers from 
excessive prices.75  New York’s legislature, for example, worried 
that “during periods of abnormal disruption of the 
market . . . some parties within the chain of distribution of 
consumer goods have taken unfair advantage of consumers by 
charging grossly excessive prices for essential consumer goods 
and services.”76  Other states emphasize that “the health, 
safety, and welfare of the citizens . . . depend on the availability 
and affordability of certain essential commodities.”77  The 
justification, then, for interfering with the right of sellers to set 
  
 72 If half the wheat crop in Holmes’s thought experiment were to burn as a 
result of a natural wildfire, prices would presumably need to rise in order to induce 
sellers in other countries to export wheat.  If an artificial price ceiling were placed on 
wheat sales, sellers and exporters would have little economic motivation to shift 
supplies to this market, and shortages would almost certainly result. 
 73 See infra Section III for a description of the economic reasoning behind 
price ceiling induced shortages. 
 74 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5101(3) (West 2006) (“Pricing of 
consumer goods and services is generally best left to the marketplace under ordinary 
conditions, but when a declared state of emergency results in abnormal disruptions of 
the market, the public interest requires that excessive and unjustified increases in the 
prices of consumer goods and services should be discouraged.”); accord ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 4-88-301 (2001); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6J-1 (2006).  See also Press Release, Off. of the 
N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Fifteen Gas Stations Fined in Hurricane Price Gouging Probe 
(Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/dec/dec19a_05.html 
(statement of New York Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer announcing the results of a three-
month probe against suspected price gougers: “No one begrudges a business the right 
to make a profit and under normal circumstances business owners may charge 
whatever price they think is appropriate.  But when disaster strikes, state law requires 
that price increases be linked directly and proportionately to increased costs.”). 
 75 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5101(3). 
 76 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r (McKinney 2003). 
 77 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160 pmbl. (West 2005). 
2007] PLANNING DISASTER 1113 
their own prices centers both on protecting the public from the 
unscrupulous and ensuring the reasonable availability of 
essential goods in the wake of a disaster.  The price ceilings 
these statutes create are unlikely to result in the realization of 
either goal. 
Price gouging laws respond to disaster, and 
consequently most statutes require some sort of market 
disrupting event: anything from a terrorist attack to a 
hurricane, earthquake, or other natural disaster.78  Usually, the 
President of the United States, the governor of a state, or some 
other authorized local official must declare a state of 
emergency.79  In addition, most statutes limit, with differing 
degrees of specificity, the categories of goods subject to a 
statutory price ceiling.80  Sellers have no obligation to maintain 
prices on goods not covered by the relevant statutes, though 
overbroad language in some statutes could conceivably cover a 
wide variety of goods and services.81 
The principal differences in the various statutes enacted 
by the states center on what constitutes the “unfair” price.  
States have adopted a number of different approaches for 
  
 78 Tennessee’s statute frequently referenced the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th and specifically noted that “[t]errorist attacks can dismantle the 
stability of markets and free trade.”  TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5101.  Louisiana’s 
statute was amended in 2005 to prohibit price gouging not only in the event of a 
declared emergency, but also “during a named tropical storm or hurricane in or 
threatening the Gulf of Mexico.”  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:732(a) (West 2007).  New 
York’s legislature, guided by experience, worried about “strikes, power failures, severe 
shortages or other extraordinarily adverse circumstances.”  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-
r. 
 79 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-303 (LexisNexis 2001) (“Upon the 
proclamation of a state of emergency . . . declared by the President of the United States 
or the Governor, [or] upon the declaration of a local emergency . . . by the executive 
officer of any city or county . . . it is unlawful . . . for any person . . . to sell or offer to 
sell [certain goods and services] for a price more than ten percent (10%) above the price 
charged immediately prior to the proclamation of emergency.”). 
 80 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 4-6-9.1-2 (LexisNexis 2002) (limiting statute to 
prohibit charging excessive prices for fuel alone); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-145(A)(2) 
(West 2006) (prohibiting price gouging of any “commodity” defined as “goods, services, 
materials, merchandise, supplies, equipment, resources, or other articles of commerce, 
and includes, without limitation, food, water, ice, chemicals, petroleum products, and 
lumber essential for consumption or use as a direct result of a declared state of 
emergency”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5103 (providing that statute applies to 
overcharges on “any consumer food item; repair or construction services; emergency 
supplies; medical supplies; building materials; gasoline; transportation, freight, and 
storage services; or housing”). 
 81 See, e.g., Treat Emergency Victims Fairly Act of 2005, S. 1854, 109th Cong. 
§ 3(2) (2005) (defining “goods or services” to mean “goods or services of any type, 
including food, transportation, housing, and energy supplies”).  It is difficult to see how 
subjecting every conceivable good or service to a price ceiling in a disaster can serve 
any useful purpose. 
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determining whether a price is “unconscionable,” which can be 
broken into three basic categories: those that limit price 
increases to a fixed percentage over pre-disaster prices, those 
that prohibit price increases that are deemed excessive, and 
those that prohibit price increases absolutely.82 
Several state statutes prohibit price increases above a 
certain proportion of the pre-disaster price.83  Arkansas law, for 
example, penalizes sellers for any price increase of “more than 
ten percent (10%) above the price charged by that person for 
those goods or services immediately prior to the proclamation 
of emergency.”84  Other states allow for increases of up to 
twenty-five percent.85  Proportional increase price gouging 
statutes present at least some pricing flexibility, but will still 
result in an effective price ceiling any time the market clearing 
price increases by more than the amount the statute will allow 
sellers to raise prices.  Sellers may also have some ability to 
raise prices before a state of emergency is formally declared, 
which may induce sellers to anticipate future supply 
constraints by raising prices before a disaster strikes. 
Other states prohibit the sale of goods at prices which 
are “unconscionable,”86 reflecting the common law exception to 
the rule that law will generally not look to price.87  The statutes 
in these cases provide little guidance as to what price level can 
be considered unconscionable, sometimes leaving it to the 
courts to determine as a matter of law.88  Many states follow 
the example of the New York statute, which provides the court 
with guidelines of what constitutes an “unconscionably 
excessive” price.89  For example, New York courts look to 
  
 82 The slight differences among the various statutes should not be 
overemphasized.  All statutes implementing effective price ceilings cause the same 
harm, the question is only one of degree.  
 83 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-303(a)(1); CAL. PENAL CODE § 396 (West 
2005). 
 84 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-303(a)(1).  The statute does allow for price 
increases “directly attributable to additional costs for labor or materials used to provide 
the services.”   Id. § 4-88-303(a)(2). 
 85 See ALA. CODE § 8-31-4 (LexisNexis 2002). 
 86 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160(2) (West 2005); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW 
§ 396-r (McKinney 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-527 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 87 See infra Part II.D.  
 88 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r.3 (providing that the question of 
“[w]hether a price is unconscionably excessive is a question for the court”). 
 89 Id.; accord FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160(1)(b) (providing that prima facie 
evidence of unconscionable pricing exists where there is a “gross disparity” between the 
price charged for a good in a time of emergency and the price charged in the usual 
course of business in the thirty days preceding the emergency, or when the price 
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whether there was a “gross disparity” between the price 
charged by a seller post-disaster and the price charged 
immediately prior to the disaster,90 as well as whether the price 
charged by a seller “grossly exceeded” the average price in the 
trade area prior to the disaster.91  Like other variations on the 
theme, most statutes do allow defendants to argue that their 
increased prices are directly attributable to increased costs.92  
Of course, defining an “unconscionable” price as any price 
which grossly exceeds the former price is hardly a model of 
clarity, but it does have the virtue of allowing some room for 
judicial flexibility not available in other iterations of price 
gouging statutes. 
Declining to adopt a vague “unconscionability” standard 
or a prohibition of price increases above a certain percentage, 
some states have adopted price gouging statutes which simply 
provide that price increases must, as a rule, be disallowed.93  
These statutes provide no room for market flexibility and fail to 
recognize any change in supply relative to demand.  It is 
difficult to condemn this particular iteration of price gouging 
statute with too much force, however, as it is only the worst in 
a crop of laws which have the same essentially harmful effect.   
As a group, the various state price gouging statutes 
impose a wildly varying array of fines and sanctions on 
  
charged “grossly exceeds” the average price charged in the trade area in the thirty days 
preceding the emergency).  
 90 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r.3. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id.  But see People v. Beach Boys Equip. Co., 709 N.Y.S. 2d 729 (App. Div. 
2000).  Defendant retailers sold generators for $1200 while other retailers in the trade 
area charged less than half that price.  Id. at 730.  The defendant argued that his price 
was attributable to additional costs imposed by its suppliers, who sold the generator to 
it for $1,000.  Id.  The court held that the defendant had not established that the price 
increase was warranted or that the bargain with the supplier was an “arms length 
transaction.”  Id. at 731.  Though the case law is scarce, the safe-harbor provided by 
justifiable price increases attributable to increased costs does not appear to afford 
much protection.  
 93 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:732(A) (West 2007) (“the value received 
for goods and services sold within the designated emergency area may not exceed the 
prices ordinarily charged for comparable goods and services in the same market area 
at, or immediately before, the time of the state of emergency”); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
393.4(a) (Lexis 2000) (“It shall be an unlawful, unfair, and deceptive trade practice for 
any person . . . to sell or offer for sale at retail any goods or services necessary to 
preserve, protect, or sustain the life, health, or safety of persons or their property at a 
price higher than the price at which such goods were sold or offered for sale 
immediately prior to the declaration of a state of emergency”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 75-
24-25(2) (2005). 
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offenders.  Penalties include injunctive relief,94 fines and 
penalties,95 restitution,96 revocation of licenses,97 and even 
significant prison sentences.98  In many states, residents are 
encouraged to report fellow citizens suspected of possible price 
gouging violations through hotlines set up by state attorneys 
general or departments of consumer protection.99  It is clear 
from both the severity of the potential punishments as well as 
states’ willingness to police and enforce the statutes that the 
price gouging statutes are likely to ensure that merchants 
comply when making pricing decisions.  
The various price gouging statutes, at least where state 
legislators indicated intent, reflect a general notion that social 
welfare will be most enhanced by ensuring a fair price for 
consumers.  The means of doing so, in this case essentially 
fixing a price for the duration of the disaster, has no precedent 
in antitrust law.  The courts interpreting the Sherman Act 
expressly declined, largely for jurisprudential reasons, to fix 
prices, choosing instead to rely on competitive markets to set 
welfare-enhancing prices.100  Price gouging statutes instead 
appear to invoke principles of the common law prohibitions on 
duress and unconscionable pricing.  As with the antitrust laws, 
however, the common law prohibitions genuinely enhance 
consumer welfare and therefore are easily distinguishable from 
price gouging statutes. 
  
 94 IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-9.1-3(2) (LexisNexis 2002); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW 
§ 396-r.4.  
 95 ALA. CODE § 8-31-5 (LexisNexis 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-9.1-3(4); N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r.4; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5104(a) (West 2006). 
 96 IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-9.1-3(3); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:734(4). 
 97 ALA. CODE § 8-31-5. 
 98 MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-25 (providing for between one and five years in 
prison when violation is willful and markup is in excess of $500); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-
5-145 (West 2006) (providing for up to 30 days imprisonment for willful or knowing 
violations).  
 99 See, e.g., Florida Dep’t of Agric. and Consumer Servs., Div. of Consumer 
Servs., Price Gouging Is Illegal, http://www.800helpfla.com/price_gouging.html (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2006); Louisiana.gov, Hurricane Information, http://katrina.louisiana. 
gov/faq.htm#gouging (last visited Jan. 29, 2006); Press Release, Off. of the N.Y. State 
Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Issues Warning Against Price Gouging in Wake of 
Severe Winter Storms (Feb. 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2007/feb/feb14a_07.html.  
 100 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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D. Fair Pricing Under the Common Law 
Under the common law, courts generally decline to 
question the adequacy of consideration in voluntary 
exchanges—which is to say that they leave prices up to buyers 
and sellers.101  Inadequacy of consideration “such as shocks the 
conscience” may, however, serve as evidence indicating 
mistake, misrepresentation, duress or undue influence.102  
Fraud and misrepresentation, of course, are always proper 
focuses of our system of law and appear to have similarly been 
the focus of commercial morality from the earliest times.103  
Likewise, an agreement secured through duress by physical 
compulsion or threat of physical compulsion is voidable.104    
The situation consumers face following a disaster is 
often described as one of duress, where the consumer is “forced” 
into a transaction in which they would otherwise not engage.105  
Charging a high market price post-disaster differs in the 
important respect that the seller charging the price played no 
role in bringing about the circumstances leading to the supply 
constraint.106  For example, if an individual threatens to shoot 
another unless she is paid $100, it may indeed increase both 
parties’ welfare if the put upon party purchases the “safety” 
she offers, but because the extortionist created the artificial 
scarcity in safety, the law does not respect the transaction.107  
Any policy to the contrary would actually encourage the 
thuggish behavior.108  The compelling logic behind voiding a 
contract formed under duress is to remove the incentives to 
create the situation in the first place, a justification which 
  
 101 See supra Part II.A; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 
(1981) (“If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement 
of . . . equivalence in the values exchanged.”). 
 102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. e (1981). 
 103 See supra Part II.A. 
 104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175-76 (1981).  “If a party’s 
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves 
the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”  Id. 
§ 175(1). 
 105 See, e.g., William Hermann, Drivers Alter Lifestyles to Deal with Gas 
Prices, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 30, 2005, at 10A (quoting a consumer who likened 
purchasing gasoline to “highway robbery,” stating that “we have to pay, we have no 
choice”). 
 106 See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER 152-53 (2000) for a discussion of the 
economics of duress. 
 107 Id. at 152. 
 108 Id. 
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plainly does not hold when the circumstances dictating the 
terms of the parties’ exchange are beyond their control. 
Unlike in the duress hypothetical, in a rescue situation, 
the rescuer is not responsible for the circumstances that 
necessitate the rescue.109  In that sense, the situation is more 
similar to a market for post-disaster necessities.110  In a rescue 
situation, the party providing the service can ask any price up 
to the full utility value the goods can provide, a set of 
circumstances economists call “bilateral monopoly.”111  The 
buyer, who must have the good and has no other alternatives, 
must pay whatever the seller asks, up to the full benefit of the 
good to him.  In a situation where the buyer’s life is at stake—
say where he is dying of a rare disease while the seller holds 
the only cure—that price might be extraordinarily high.112  
Where, as here, the buyer’s agreement to the exchange was 
extracted solely through his distress, neither fairness nor 
efficiency supports the application of the bargain principle.113  
Courts in these situations generally award a judicially 
determined “fair” price for the rescue, ignoring any bargain 
independently reached by the parties.114   
Though the above example might superficially appear to 
support a regime of price ceilings in disaster scenarios, post-
  
 109 See id. at 153-56 for a discussion of the economics of rescue.  Professor 
Eisenberg instead uses the term “distress” to describe a situation where “party A 
makes a bargain with B at a time when, through no fault of B, A is in a state of 
necessity that effectively compels him to enter into a bargain on any terms he can get.”  
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 
754 (1982).  
 110 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 106, at 153. 
 111 Id. at 155. 
 112 Eisenberg gives the following example: 
The Desperate Traveler.  T, a symphony musician, has been driving through 
the desert on a recreational trip, when he suddenly hits a rock jutting out 
from the sand.  T’s vehicle is disabled and his ankle is fractured.  He has no 
radio and little water, and will die if he is not soon rescued.  The next day, G, 
a university geologist who is returning to Tucson from an inspection of desert 
rock formations, adventitiously passes within sight of the accident and drives 
over to investigate.  T explains the situation and asks G to take him back to 
Tucson, which is sixty miles away.  G replies that he will help only if T 
promises to pay him two-thirds of his wealth or $100,000, whichever is more.  
T agrees, but after they return to Tucson he refuses to keep his promise, and 
G brings an action to enforce it. 
Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 755. 
 113 Id. at 755-56. 
 114 Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 150, 159 (1856) (“The contrivance of an auction 
sale, . . . where the master of the Richmond was hopeless, helpless, and passive—where 
there was no market, no money, no competition . . . is a transaction which has no 
characteristic of a valid contract.”). 
2007] PLANNING DISASTER 1119 
disaster markets are critically different in a number of 
respects.  The primary difference between a distress situation 
and a market for post-disaster goods centers on the number of 
suppliers.  Distress scenarios are premised on the concept of 
bilateral monopoly.115  Recasting a traditional distress scenario 
with even as few as two rescuers fundamentally limits the 
bargaining power of either seller.  The rescuer may still hope to 
profit from the transaction, but any excessive gains will be 
limited by the competing bid of her competitor.116  A rational 
bidding process should result in a rescue price equal to cost 
plus a reasonable profit.117  Any collusive agreement, express or 
implied, between the two rescuers to charge a higher price is, of 
course, a violation of the antitrust laws described in Part 
II.B.118  True examples of bilateral monopoly are rare, and most 
post-disaster markets will be served by multiple sellers, 
negating the applicability of the doctrine for the purposes of 
price gouging statutes. 
Price gouging statutes are by no means a logical 
extension of common law principles or even of other consumer 
oriented legislation such as antitrust and antifraud laws.  They 
draw their moral weight from the goals they articulate, rather 
than from their ability to achieve them.119  The aims of the 
statutes are uniformly to protect the consumer from unfairness 
and to ensure that they will be able to secure essential goods at 
fair prices.120  “Fair” prices under the common law, as we have 
seen, are usually the competitive prices.  This is not because of 
  
 115 Bilateral monopoly is defined as the situation where the wealth-
maximizing transactions fail due to the fact that each party has only one potential 
trading partner and each engages in strategic behavior to appropriate the full gains of 
the trade.  See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 258-62 (1984). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 756 (“When a commodity is sold under 
perfect competition, the doctrine of distress would usually have no application, even to 
contracts for necessities.”).  Two competitors by no means ensures “perfect 
competition,” but the ability of one rescuer to extract extraordinary surplus gains 
would be severely limited, provided there is no illegal collusion between the two 
parties.  
 119 Price gouging statutes express a desire to protect consumers, but by simply 
fixing prices by governmental fiat, they are unlikely to help consumers in practice. 
 120 The Arkansas law states that “some merchants have taken unfair 
advantage of consumers by greatly increasing prices for essential consumer goods or 
services.”  ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-301 (2005).  New York’s and Florida’s statutes 
express similar concerns regarding the “unfair advantage” merchants might take of 
consumers in need.  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r (McKinney 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 501.160 pmbl. (West 2005). 
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some sort of laissez-faire, libertarian fetishism, but because the 
common law has often recognized the market’s extraordinary 
ability to operate as an instrument of consumer welfare.  Price 
gouging statutes interfere with that process and palpably harm 
consumers in the days and weeks following a disaster, as the 
following analysis of the economics of shortages demonstrates.    
III. THE TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC VIEW 
Most price gouging statutes do not provide for 
prohibitions on price adjustments unless there is some sort of 
triggering event which results in an “abnormal disruption” of 
the market.121  New York’s statute specifically defines the 
phrase “abnormal disruption” as:  
[A]ny change in the market, whether actual or imminently 
threatened, resulting from stress of weather, convulsion of nature, 
failure or shortage of electric power or other source of energy, strike, 
civil disorder, war, military action, national or local emergency, or 
other cause of an abnormal disruption of the market which results in 
the declaration of a state of emergency by the governor.122  
Such a definition fundamentally misunderstands both the 
functioning and the capability of a market.  Markets are 
notable for their ability to respond to changed circumstances 
and, based on those circumstances, to rationally allocate goods 
to their most valued users.123  Statutes which interfere with 
market operations based on nothing more than “any 
change . . . resulting from stress” have created a perverse 
situation that handicaps markets just when the need for a 
mechanism to rationally distribute goods is in greatest need.124  
This section will explain how markets do that under normal 
conditions, as well as what happens to supply when poorly 
reasoned laws interfere with those workings. 
  
 121 See, e.g., Zeke Minaya, World Series Parking Takes Big League Bucks, 
HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 26, 2005, at A6 (reporting that although sports enthusiasts 
accused parking lot owners who quintupled parking prices during the World Series of 
price gouging, “[a]ccording to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, price-gouging 
prohibitions are only triggered after a disaster to prevent businesses from charging 
excessive prices during times of dire need”). 
 122 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r. 
 123 See H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 161 (1994) 
(“Competitive markets allocate property both efficiently and equitably provided the 
goods were equitably allocated to begin with.”). 
 124 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r. 
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A. Why Do Prices Rise After a Disaster? 
The standard price gouging statute suggests that large 
increases in prices following a disaster are indicative of a kind 
of breakdown in the market system which, absent the 
abnormal shock, tends to operate very well.125  That view is 
mistaken; large post-disaster increases in price are a rational, 
predictable, and useful response to the new circumstances of 
reduced supply relative to demand, not a market failure 
because of it.126  The traditional argument for why prices rise in 
the wake of a disaster is a simple case of a market response to 
shortages.127  The catastrophic event, whether hurricane or 
terrorist attack, causes a reduction in the supply of an 
available good.128  Consumers, whose need for the good has not 
necessarily changed as a result of the disaster,129 bid against 
one another in order to purchase the quantity of goods each 
desires.130  This competitive bidding for limited supply leads to 
price increases, which will continue until the market price 
reaches equilibrium—that point where consumers and 
suppliers have no incentive to change either price or 
quantity.131  
Higher prices, then, are evidence of a functioning 
market, not of an abnormal disruption in market operations 
requiring governmental intervention.  High prices reflect the 
simple fact that people need things which they cannot get, and 
that they want them enough that they are willing to pay a 
higher price in order to get them.132  Sellers, of course, would 
happily set the price as high as buyers would willingly pay, 
disaster or not.133  The ability of sellers to raise prices is 
  
 125 See supra Part III. 
 126 See YOUNG, supra note 123, at 120. 
 127 See STIGLITZ, supra note 58, at 110 (defining a “shortage” as a situation 
when “people would like to buy something, but they simply cannot find it for sale at the 
going price”).   
 128 Id. 
 129 Catastrophes will affect consumer demand for different goods in different 
ways. Demand for basic goods such as food and potable water should remain the same, 
although the supply of those goods might be severely constrained.  Demand for goods 
related to repair and response to the disaster would presumably increase, while 
demand for luxury goods could be expected to decrease. 
 130 See STIGLITZ, supra note 58, at 89. 
 131 Id.  
 132 Id. 
 133 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING 
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 9 (1994) (noting that sellers will seek to 
maximize prices by selling their goods at the highest competitive price while 
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restricted by competition with other sellers, who will try to 
earn the business of buyers by offering the best price consistent 
with a profit.134  Setting an arbitrary price for the goods people 
wish, which is precisely what price gouging statutes do, does 
not change the fundamental nature of the supply and demand 
relationships just described.135  Price ceilings can, however, 
result in a number of predictable harms, including shortages 
and misallocation of existing supply.136 
In the short run, price gouging statutes do not create 
shortages so much as they prevent their remedy.  The initial 
shortages will normally stem from the disaster itself, perhaps 
through causing increased demand for items in short supply, 
by destroying stockpiled supplies of certain items, or by 
preventing their re-supply.  Shortages can really only be 
addressed effectively through some combination of two 
methods: increasing supply or allocating existing supplies more 
efficiently.137  The most obviously useful method, as recognized 
by the Talmudic Sage Shumuel,138 is to increase the supply of 
the good in question as quickly as possible.  The second option, 
which becomes increasingly more important as the ability to 
increase supply diminishes, is to allocate limited supplies in 
such a way as to gain the most utility from their use.  Price 
ceilings are extraordinarily poor at doing either, and virtually 
assure a third, less attractive, option: that the victims of 
natural disasters will go without.  
B. Increasing Supplies 
Shortly after Hurricane Rita swept through Broward 
County, Florida, David Bercovicz began selling bottled water 
  
maintaining the lowest cost possible per unit).  However, there are exceptions to the 
general rule that sellers will seek to maximize utility only through price.  See infra 
Part III.D.1. 
 134 See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 133. 
 135 See STIGLITZ, supra note 58, at 113-14. 
 136 See generally Edgar O. Olson, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 
J. POL. ECON. 1081 (1972). 
 137 The assertions are self-evident.  For example, when faced with a shortage 
of nurses, a hospital is necessarily faced with a limited range of options.  It might 
choose to hire more nurses or some close substitute who can provide the same services.  
The hospital might also try to stretch its existing staff to cover its needs, perhaps by 
requiring longer hours or utilizing the staff more efficiently.  There is, of course, a third 
option: the hospital and its patients may simply accept the shortages and go without, 
an option that becomes less attractive as the service the nurses would provide becomes 
more critical. 
 138 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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out of the back of a U-Haul for $10.00 per case of twenty-four 
one-liter bottles.139  Sheriff’s deputies, after learning that a 
nearby Publix grocery store was selling the same cases for half 
the price, arrested him for price gouging.140  Bercovicz had 
driven the water-filled truck to Broward County from the 
relatively untouched city of Tampa, Florida,141 a distance of 
over 200 miles.142  In so doing, Bercovicz almost certainly 
violated Florida’s price gouging statute, which prohibits 
charging any price which “grossly exceeds the average price” at 
which the commodity was available before the storm.143  An 
analysis of the social benefit of his actions, however, no matter 
how self-interested the impetus, provide a useful starting point 
for a discussion of the utility of a liberal post-disaster market. 
Some may disapprove of what they consider Bercovicz’s 
excessive avarice, especially when his gain comes at the 
expense of those suffering through no fault of their own.  The 
assumption that the seller’s gain must come at the buyer’s 
expense is, however, incorrect.  No matter what one may 
personally think of Bercovicz or his motives, it is clear that the 
net social benefit of his actions is positive.  His foray into the 
retail water business is exactly the type of behavior we should 
expect and, indeed, encourage.  He purchased water, an 
essential post-disaster good, from Tampa, where prices were 
presumably low, representing its relative abundance.  He then 
drove them to Broward County where he was able to sell them 
at a much higher price, indicative of water’s relative scarcity at 
that locale.144  Nobody was required to buy his water, indeed, 
the identical product was for sale at a nearby grocery store at 
half the price.145  The fact that anyone was willing to purchase 
Bercovicz’s water indicates that either: (1) the supply of lower 
priced water was depleted, or (2) purchasing water from the 
grocery store involved other costs, such as waiting in line or 
  
 139 Abhi Raghunathan, South Florida Shortages Fuel Black Market, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at 1B. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Posting of Bonnie Gross to Sun-Sentinel Hurricane Weblog, 
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/weather/weblog/hurricane/archives/2005/10/ 
entrepeneur_or.html (Oct. 27, 2005, 21:07 EST). 
 142 About: Florida for Visitors, Florida Driving Distances, http://goflorida. 
about.com/library/bls/bl_driving_distances.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2007). 
 143 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160 (West 2005).   
 144 Raghunathan, supra note 139. 
 145 Id. 
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traveling a greater distance.146  In either case the consumer is 
better off than if the water they needed had stayed in Tampa, 
which is no doubt where it would have remained had Bercovicz 
been unable to charge more than the pre-disaster price.147 
The relocation of goods from locations of relatively high 
prices to those where prices are relatively low is known as 
arbitrage.148  It is possible that the arbitreurs have positive 
social motivations, but it is certainly not necessary.  The simple 
act of moving goods from where they are abundant to where 
they are scarce has the beneficial effect of equalizing the prices 
between the two locations.149  This is important in post-disaster 
scenarios in which high prices are the result of shortages.  
Arbitreurs taking advantage of the high prices will move 
supplies into the areas where supplies are low, and in so doing 
will increase supply and lower prices, moving the market closer 
to the pre-disaster situation.150  This is especially important in 
situations where government action may be considered 
inadequate.151  
Local suppliers—those who are not simply relocating 
goods from locations of abundance to locations of scarcity—
respond to a similar set of incentives.  Provided the proper 
incentive scheme is in place, local suppliers arbitrage by 
purchasing essential goods at a time of relative abundance and 
sell at a time of relative scarcity, storing the good in the 
meantime.  Suppliers have little incentive to store excess goods 
  
 146 See Floridians Frustrated by Lack of Relief Supplies; Authorities Raise 
State’s Death Toll to 10 as Hurricane Wilma Cleanup Continues, RECORD (Kitchener-
Waterloo, Ontario), Oct. 27, 2005, at A6 [hereinafter Floridians Frustrated] (reporting 
that basic commodities required hours of waiting in line, up to five hours for fuel and 
nine hours for water and ice). 
 147 This is true whether the consumer benefited indirectly from the decreased 
competition for the water as a result of the removal of all the buyers who purchased 
from the alternative sources, or because the consumer benefited actually purchased the 
water directly from Bercovicz and thus avoided whatever alternative the consumer 
decided was less attractive.  
 148 “Arbitrage” is defined as trading a good in different markets in which it 
commands differing prices.  WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 297-300 (3d ed. 1988). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Arbitrage opportunities offer the chance for high returns at little or no 
risk.  See  STIGLITZ, supra note 58, at 241.  In competitive markets, these opportunities 
will quickly disappear as savvy investors purchase the relatively low priced item and 
sell the relatively high priced item.  Id.  The process ends when the prices are 
essentially the same.  Id.  
 151 See Audrey Hudson, Storm Victims Praise Churches; Rate Response Efforts 
Highest, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at A1 (reporting that Louisiana residents gave 
government agencies consistently low ratings for their response to Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita). 
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in anticipation of increased demand at a later date unless they 
can sell those goods at a price that reflects that demand and 
covers their costs of interim storage.  Most businesses must 
keep some amount of inventory in stock at all times, the 
storage of which represents a significant cost.  Profit-
maximizing firms face a trade-off between the costs of holding 
inventory and the risk of being unable to satisfy consumer 
demand if inventories are insufficient;152 this cost-benefit 
analysis continues all the way up the supply line.153   
Gasoline is a prime example of a commodity where 
demand is price-inelastic in the short term; that is the demand 
for gasoline is not immediately sensitive to price.154  Some 
researchers have suggested that in situations where consumers 
are unable to shift their demand significantly in the short 
term, storage of the commodity might play a role in reducing 
price volatility.155  The benefits of storage capacity, however, 
are necessarily limited by the availability and costs of that 
capacity.156  Basically, if it costs suppliers more to store 
commodities than they can be re-sold for, suppliers will have no 
incentive to store.157 
The common argument against both types of arbitrage—
that speculators keep goods off the market, creating shortages 
and price instability—is entirely wrong.158  Indeed, the opposite 
is true: the speculator wishes to buy low and sell high, but the 
effect of his actions is to place upward pressure on prices when 
goods are abundant and downward pressure on those same 
goods when they are scarce, in effect leading to less price 
volatility overall.159  It is conceivable that a single supplier 
could “corner the market” by controlling all the supplies in a 
given market, but in such an eventuality consumers can always 
look to the antitrust laws for recourse.160   
  
 152 C. Erik Larson, Lars J. Olson & Sunil Sharma, Optimal Inventory Policies 
When the Demand of Distribution Is Not Known, 101 J. ECON. THEORY 281, 286 (2001).  
 153 Id. 
 154 SEVERIN BORENSTEIN, JAMES BUSHNELL & MATT LEWIS, UNIV. OF CAL. 
ENERGY INST., MARKET POWER IN CALIFORNIA’S GASOLINE MARKET 8 (2004), 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2004-05-28_600-04-004.pdf. 
 155 Id. at 11. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id.  at 13. 
 158 FRIEDMAN, supra note 106, at 169. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See supra Part II.B.  
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In conclusion, a market with a floating price indicative 
of true supply and demand should result in increased goods 
delivered from outside the region, as well as increased goods as 
a consequence of speculative storage by local suppliers.161  The 
consequence of increased supply will usually be to lower prices, 
as suppliers compete on price in order to unload inventories.162  
Increased supply, besides leading to lower prices through 
competition, leads to lower costs for consumers through shorter 
lines.  With twice the number of suppliers, one could assume 
that the time spent waiting in line would be halved.  The 
savings could be significant considering that some Floridians 
reported spending up to nine hours in line for basic 
commodities after Hurricane Wilma.163 
C. Allocating Supplies More Efficiently 
Any disaster response policy hoping to increase social 
welfare by ensuring adequate supplies of emergency goods 
should also consider the role the price mechanism has in 
efficiently allocating existing supplies.  The price ceilings 
created by gouging statutes inevitably result in the 
misallocation of goods, both among consumers in the market 
competing for goods, and between markets regulated by the 
price ceiling and liberal markets.164  It is possible that some 
goods, such as lodging, will not as readily lend themselves to 
increased supply in the short term.165  When supply is limited 
in the short term, the price mechanism provides an efficient 
method of allocating goods to the most valued user.166  There 
are, of course, other ways of distributing goods besides relying 
on price.  Indeed, when price is controlled, some other form of 
allocation must play a role in distributing goods.167  Rationing of 
  
 161 BORENSTEIN, BUSHNELL & LEWIS, supra note 154. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Floridians Frustrated, supra note 146. 
 164 Paul W. MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14 
J.L. & ECON. 167, 169 (1971) (noting that interstate price ceilings caused “substantial 
misallocations of new supplies away from the consumers the [Federal Power 
Commission] was seeking to favor”).  
 165 The supply of lodging might not increase in response to price immediately 
after a disaster, but it is possible that at least some lodging suppliers might increase 
supply prior to a disaster in anticipation of the higher post-disaster price they might 
expect to charge. 
 166 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 106, at 181. 
 167 Stephen Martin & Peter C. Smith, Rationing by Waiting Lists: An 
Empirical Investigation, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 141, 142 (1999). 
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some sort usually plays a role, the most familiar form of 
rationing is queuing, essentially allocating goods to those most 
willing to stand in line for them.168  
Queuing describes the process where buyers physically 
join and wait in a line to gain access to the goods they desire.169  
Of course, waiting in line imposes opportunity costs to the 
extent that the time spent waiting in line could be put to 
productive use elsewhere.170  The addition of opportunity costs 
to the nominal costs that the buyer will actually pay when he 
exchanges cash for the goods he seeks plays a role in ensuring 
that high value users will receive the goods.171  The concern, 
however, is with the efficiency of the queuing method.  Besides 
the potentially tremendous expense,172 the high costs 
consumers pay are essentially wasted.  Neither consumers nor 
suppliers benefit from the long lines.  Consumers obviously 
suffer, as they pay a higher price for goods.  Sellers do not 
benefit, since the opportunity costs of time consumers pay do 
not accrue to the sellers.  In short, time spent waiting in line is 
wasted. 
Allocating goods through queuing imposes other costs as 
well.  Speculators reallocate goods sold by the seller on a first-
come, first-served basis at a set price to those who are willing 
to pay the most for them.173  In Florida, for example, motorists 
who were unwilling to wait in line paid those who were willing 
to do it for them.174  Again, allocative efficiency is enhanced in 
  
 168 Id. 
 169 Id.; see also Robert T. Deacon & Jon Sonstelie, The Welfare Costs of 
Rationing by Waiting, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 179 (1989) (describing motorists confronted 
with a choice between waiting in line for low priced gasoline or purchasing higher 
priced gasoline without waiting). 
 170 Opportunity costs are the benefits sacrificed when a resource such as time 
is employed for one purpose that prevents its use for another purpose.  See RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6-7 (2d ed. 1977). 
 171 Martin & Smith, supra note 167, at 146. 
 172 For example, a Florida woman reported waiting in line for nine hours at 
one designated relief-supply station.  She left with thirteen kilograms of ice and six 
liters of bottled water.  Floridians Frustrated, supra note 146.  Assuming the value of 
Ms. Aristil’s time is at least five dollars per hour, she essentially paid in excess of forty-
five dollars for basic supplies, a price that under Florida law is unconscionable.  See 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160 (West 2005).   
 173 See generally James L. Swofford, Arbitrage, Speculation, and Public Policy 
Toward Ticket Scalping, 27 PUB. FIN. REV. 531 (1999) (analyzing the “scalping” 
markets that arise from allocation by queuing in ticket markets). 
 174 See Raghunathan, supra note 139.  In post-Wilma Florida, “instant 
entrepreneurs” waited (or were paid to wait) in long lines to buy gasoline which they 
would then resell at much higher prices.  Id. (As one man, who had been paid ten 
dollars to wait in line plus whatever it cost to fill a bucket with gas, said, “They didn’t 
want to wait, but I’m a very patient man.”). 
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that gasoline went to those who were willing to pay the most 
for it.  More problematic is the fact that the suppliers, those in 
a position to get and distribute more of the product if it is 
valuable to do so, share in none of the benefit.  Because the 
sellers do not benefit from the market transactions, the sellers 
have little or no incentive to work to increase supplies. 
Non-price rationing also tends to result in the creation 
of illegitimate markets.  The most obvious way market actors 
might avoid price controls is to create black markets in the 
goods they need.175  Suppliers obviously have incentives to raise 
prices; and when faced with the alternative of going without 
required goods, consumers in the greatest need have the 
incentive to pay them.176  The predictable result is that some 
consumers will pay bribes to secure the goods they need—
transactions which, if frequent enough, result in fully 
developed black markets.177  Prices in the black market will 
usually be higher not only than those in the regulated market, 
but than the prices that could be expected in a free market, 
since the costs and risks of engaging in illegal activity further 
limit supplies and the only buyers will be the most desperate.178 
Relying on price to allocate goods will normally result in 
a more efficient allocation of existing supplies.  Imagine a 
situation in which a limited supply of potable water is available 
post-disaster, say fifty gallons.  Pricing based on market 
demand normally has the advantage of assuring that a good 
will go to the user who places the most value on its use.  In a 
market with an artificially low price, users who happen to be in 
a position to purchase the water (perhaps because they were 
first in line, or, in a rationing situation, were simply assigned a 
quantity greater than their need) have no economic incentive to 
limit the amount of their purchases.  If water can be obtained 
inexpensively, users might purchase water not only for 
drinking, but for less valued activities, like doing the dishes or 
watering a favorite plant.  Allowing the price to reflect the new 
realities of supply and demand ensures that the water will end 
up in the hands of those that value it the most, presumably 
  
 175 Hugh Rockoff, Price Controls, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PriceControls.html (last visited Jan. 
16, 2005). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
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those who are most in need of it.179  This arguably favors those 
with the means to purchase the water at the higher price, but 
at least such a system minimizes potential waste which, when 
combined with the other benefits of liberalization, results in 
the greatest good for the greatest number of people.180  Selling 
at competitive prices allocates goods to the buyers who place 
the greatest value on them and encourages the channeling of 
goods to that end.181 
Even in markets where supply is inelastic in the short 
term, the price mechanism plays an important allocative 
function.  In the market for lodging, for example, increased 
prices in the short term are less likely to lead to an increase in 
supply.182  Hotels take time to build, and though the prospect of 
being able to charge a high price in the future might induce 
some amount of additional construction pre-disaster, increased 
prices resulting from an unanticipated catastrophe is unlikely 
to change absolute supply significantly.  What the price 
mechanism does encourage, however, is the efficient use of 
existing supplies.183  High prices are likely to induce those who 
have alternatives to renting a room, such as staying with 
family, to do so.  High prices might also induce individuals to 
pool resources and to share rooms, leaving more capacity open 
to others.  It is clear, then, that even when supply is fixed in 
  
 179 Id. 
 180 See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1547 n.223 (1999).  Kades 
gives the following example:  
[C]onsider another context giving rise to frequent complaints of windfalls:  
hardware stores charging high prices for everything from flashlights to 
shovels in the wake of a natural disaster such as a hurricane.  If the store 
owner cannot raise prices in the short run (before additional supplies can 
arrive), then someone may wander in and buy the last flashlight to use as a 
nightlight for a mildly scared child, while the next person to rush in may 
need one to search for survivors in a collapsed building.  A higher price 
signals less needy users to forgo consumption in favor of those in greater 
need.  Contrary to popular belief, then, raising prices in the wake of a 
disaster is not price gouging—indeed, it may save lives.  
Id. 
 181 See Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 757. 
 182 This holds at least in terms of arbitrage over space.  No matter how 
attractive lodging prices become to hotel developers, they will be unable to create 
additional capacity in the short term.  
 183 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 
(1972); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499, 502-08 (1961) (arguing that efficient resource allocation and informed 
economic decision-making require that the actual and full costs of goods or services be 
known and accounted for). 
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the short term, maintaining free post-disaster markets is likely 
to result in a more efficient allocation of existing supplies.    
D. Economically Vulnerable Populations and the Price 
Mechanism 
The primary critique levied against the liberal approach 
to post-disaster markets is that a reliance on price to allocate 
goods will leave the most economically vulnerable unable to 
obtain the goods they need if they are forced to compete against 
wealthier buyers on the basis of price.184  There are a number of 
reasons why this seemingly valid concern is unfounded: 
(1) many sellers maintain stable-price policies as a way of 
gaining community good-will; (2) increased supply brought 
about by flexible prices will reduce the proportion of emergency 
goods that move through the black-market, where the poor are 
least likely to compete; and (3) disaster relief programs 
complementary to the economic aid available in the absence of 
a disaster could easily and efficiently be made available to 
those most in need.  An open-market approach should also 
result in net gains for those most in need.  
1. Voluntary Price Stabilization 
Even if the states were to repeal price gouging statutes, 
it seems clear that a significant number of retailers would not 
change their pricing decisions.185  If at least some suppliers 
maintain prices at pre-disaster levels, consumers who are 
unable to afford the market price will still be in at least as good 
a position as when retailers were subject to the artificial price 
ceilings.  While many retailers voluntarily maintain stable 
  
 184 See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Assessing Anti-Price-Gouging Statutes in the 
Wake of Hurricane Katrina: Why They’re Necessary in Emergencies, but Need to Be 
Rewritten.  FINDLAW, Sept. 16, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/ 
20050916.html (“[W]hen people are poor—as so many affected by Katrina were—ability 
to pay is a poor proxy for need.  Those who cannot afford to pay inflated prices, may 
find themselves in desperate straits—without milk for babies, or the drinkable water, 
minimum food, or important medicine needed to stay alive.  We have rightly decided, in 
our society, not to let people suffer this way.  And in an emergency, those who are most 
vulnerable need to be priced in, not priced out.”). 
 185 See Justin Gillis & Michael Barbaro, Revenue, the Second Flood; Retail 
Sales Skyrocket as Storm Survivors Buy Generators, Gas Cans, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 
2005, at D1  (“The big national chains . . . [are] also enforcing strict policies against 
price gouging.”); Don Nelson, Some Athens Businesses Feeling the Effects of Katrina, 
ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (Georgia), Sept. 25, 2005 (“Lowe’s has a policy against price 
gouging, and actually froze prices to pre-Katrina levels.”). 
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prices even in the wake of a disaster, there is unfortunately no 
empirical evidence describing either the type or number of 
businesses that typically refuse to adjust their prices upward.  
Intuitively, we can assume that businesses for which the 
goodwill of the communities in which they operate are an 
important part of the value of their enterprise will be careful to 
balance short term profits available from disaster pricing with 
the long term benefits of community goodwill.  Home Depot, for 
example, has a policy of freezing prices during a declared 
emergency, even if wholesale prices rise above the retail 
price.186  Of course, we cannot know whether Home Depot’s 
decision is based on a rational calculation that the goodwill of 
the community is worth more than the short term profits to be 
had, or whether the company is simply observing the state 
price gouging statutes.187  It seems likely, however, that at least 
some retailers will maintain prices at the pre-disaster level, 
benefiting consumers willing or able to wait in line long enough 
to buy desired merchandise.188  
Further, some of the most effective post-disaster 
responses to the 2005 hurricanes came from non-market actors 
such as churches and non-profits.189  There is no reason to 
expect that free-market prices would reduce the response of 
non-market actors in providing goods, as the need for relief will 
still be acute.  Victims of disaster who are unable to compete on 
price would still have recourse to retailers who maintain stable 
prices as well as to non-market actors who provide goods at 
little or no cost.  Introducing additional sellers, regardless of 
the price they charge, will have a beneficial effect on even the 
poorest of consumers because the competition for the 
remaining goods will be less keen.  Every person who has the 
means and the will to purchase water from the back of a U-
  
 186 Gillis & Barbaro, supra note 185. 
 187 It seems clear from the statutes that Home Depot, depending on the state 
in which it is doing business, would not be able to raise the price of items currently in 
stock to a price significantly above the pre-disaster level.  However, if on re-ordering 
merchandise the company faced increased wholesaler costs, it is equally clear that 
most state statutes would allow the retailer to pass those prices on to consumers. 
 188 See Gillis & Barbaro, supra note 156 (reporting that the line for generators 
at a Home Depot store began before five in the morning and grew to 600 customers by 
the afternoon).  
 189 Hudson, supra note 151 (quoting a Louisiana State University study which 
reported that “Louisiana residents were not particularly charitable when it came to 
evaluating government response [to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita] . . . but were 
considerably more favorable of the efforts of faith-based organizations and nonprofits, 
including local community foundations and the Red Cross”). 
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Haul truck is one less person in line at the price-stabilized 
grocery store or aid station, and shorter lines mean that more 
goods will be available at effectively lower prices to those who 
must wait. 
2. Avoidance of Black Markets 
Disconnects between market prices and official prices of 
goods very often lead to black market operations.  In these 
situations, sellers recognize that there are buyers who, for 
whatever reason, are willing to pay a higher price to ensure 
access to their desired goods.  The higher prices on the black 
market will cause the seller to divert goods away from the 
legitimate market in favor of the higher prices that might be 
received on the black market.  Of course, the opportunities to 
profit from high black market prices might draw more supply 
into the market, which would have a net benefit overall, as 
described above.  Markets that only allow for increased 
supplies in unofficial markets, however, favor primarily those 
who possess the information necessary to take part in the 
illegal transactions.  Markets characterized by significant 
imbalance of information are less likely to perform as 
efficiently as those in which information is relatively well 
dispersed.  Further, buyers and sellers operating on black 
markets are likely to waste undue resources attempting to 
avoid detection, an increased transaction cost that benefits no 
one.  
3. Aid Programs 
It is important to recognize that the needs of the 
economically vulnerable do not begin with the declaration  that 
a disaster related state of emergency exists nor do they end 
with the disaster.  The poor are often unable to compete on 
price for the goods they need, not only during the aftermath of 
a disaster, but in their everyday lives.  For these people, the 
same aid programs that ensure access to goods throughout the 
year can be expanded to provide access to goods in times of 
emergency.  For example, the Women, Infants, and Children 
(“WIC”) program provides vouchers that allow recipients to 
purchase certain enumerated goods at the market price.190  The 
  
 190 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food and Nutrition Serv., About WIC, 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/aboutwic/mission.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
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retailer then presents the voucher to the program 
administrator and collects the retail price that particular 
retailer charges.191  A similar program could be instituted for 
emergency goods.  State and federal government agencies could 
distribute vouchers through existing aid networks allowing the 
holder to purchase enumerated goods at the prevailing market 
price.192  The effective period of the vouchers could be limited to 
times of declared emergency by local, state, or federal 
authorities.  Such a system would have the added advantage of 
increasing liquidity in a potentially illiquid post-disaster 
market.193   
IV. POLICY APPROACHES 
In October of 2005, residents of Mexico, Cuba, and 
Florida prepared themselves as one of the most powerful 
storms ever recorded barreled its way across the Caribbean Sea 
and towards their homes.194  The storm eventually weakened, 
but still reached U.S. shores as a dangerous category III 
hurricane, killing at least twenty-two people and leaving more 
than five million people without electricity at least two days 
after the storm.195  Wilma was remarkable in another respect: it 
was the third category V hurricane in the 2005 storm season, 
the highest incidence of storms of such magnitude since record-
keeping began in 1851.196  If the devastation caused by the 2005 
season’s storms is suggestive of future hurricane seasons, the 
need to institute policies to respond effectively should be 
apparent. 
  
 191 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food and Nutrition Serv., WIC and Retail Stores, 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/WICRetailStoresfactsheet.pdf. 
 192 This is only one possible approach of many.  See, e.g., Posting of Gary 
Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, Comment on Price Gouging, http://www.becker-
posner-blog.com/archives/2005/10/comment_on_pric.html (Oct. 23, 2005, 05:06PM) 
(suggesting that in circumstances where the poorest families are unable to pay market 
prices in times of famine, the government might “become active in buying rice or 
whatever crop is involved, and reselling that to poor families at lower 
prices . . . increase income transfers to the poor that would enable them to pay the high 
market prices”). 
 193 See generally Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, 
and the Legal and Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 KY. L.J. 535 
(2006) (describing the potential for the collapse of the electronic payment system on 
which our economy depends).  
 194 Andrew Ward, Wilma Builds Rapidly into a Category Five Hurricane, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Oct. 20, 2005, Americas section, at 9.   
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FRONTRUNNER, Oct. 27, 2005.  
 196 Ward, supra note 194. 
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Few lawmakers can hope to have a constituency with a 
firm enough understanding of basic economic principles to 
allow them to pass legislation preventing state and local 
authorities from interfering with markets in times of 
disaster.197  Indeed, popular calls are to increase the number of 
such laws.198  Any policy response must therefore address the 
obvious negative effects the imposition of price ceilings would 
cause, while still respecting principles of federalism and 
democracy.  Calls by state legislators to repeal price gouging 
statutes are likely to be met with hostility by constituents.199  
Public opinion certainly must be taken into account in 
proposing any policy solution.  This is even true where, as here, 
the evidence strongly suggests that public opinion is 
misinformed about the likely effects of price ceilings, and where 
the most beneficial policy response is, at first glance, 
counterintuitive.  Recognizing this, proponents of free post-
disaster markets must admit that direct repeal of price gouging 
statutes is unlikely anytime soon. 
Price gouging laws do not necessarily create a collective 
action problem; presumably, the converse is true.  States with 
price gouging laws should have greater difficulty maintaining 
(and, post-disaster, attracting) supplies of emergency goods 
than those states with free markets.  The reason is clear: if a 
supplier can either sell his gasoline in Texas’ free market for 
five dollars a gallon or sell it at the statutory maximum of 
three dollars in Louisiana, he will rationally choose Texas in 
every instance.  The Texas market will draw needed supplies, 
while in Louisiana consumers will go without.  Texan 
  
 197 See Posting of Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, Should Price 
Gouging in the Aftermath of Catastrophes Be Punished?, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2005/10/should_price_go.html (Oct. 23, 2005, 05:30PM) (suggesting 
that calls for price gouging statutes by the general public are prompted by “sheer 
ignorance of basic economics (a failure of our educational system) and demagogic 
appeals by politicians to that ignorance”).  
 198 See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.) to Governor Ted 
Kulongoski (Sept. 20, 2005) (urging the governor of Oregon to organize a special 
session of the state legislature to pass a bill “that would protect Oregonians from price 
gouging at the pump”); Trip Jennings, Session to Suspend Gas Tax Possible; Governor 
Leaning Toward Calling Legislature Back Next Month, ALBUQUERQUE J. (New Mexico), 
Sept. 18, 2005, at A1 (reporting that Governor of New Mexico considering calling the 
legislature into special session to pass legislation “to give New Mexicans relief from 
painful gasoline and natural gas prices”).  
 199 A search of recent news articles failed to uncover even a single example of 
a state politician calling for the repeal of an existing state price gouging statute.  From 
time to time, legislative bodies do manage to defeat the enactment of new legislation, 
but the trend certainly seems to be toward stronger and more numerous laws creating 
price ceilings. 
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consumers are able to buy what they need and are better off, 
even if the nominal price is higher.  However, it is easier for 
the consumer in Texas to gather information about nominal 
price in Louisiana than it is for her to discover how much of 
that good is actually available at that price.  Accordingly, the 
Texan voter may view the Louisiana price gouging statute as a 
success in keeping prices down, while the Louisiana voter may 
have difficulty in seeing the connection between the shortage of 
gasoline and the harmful economic policy that contributed to it.  
Instead of mandating policy or expecting an enlightened 
state legislator to risk the wrath of her constituency, the 
federal government should institute an incentive system that 
rewards state adoption of disaster relief laws that are more in 
tune with the laws of supply and demand.  One aspect of such a 
program might be to direct relief supplies based on the need for 
those supplies as indicated by the price mechanism.  High 
prices for goods, as discussed above, indicate a constrained 
supply relative to demand.200  The federal government could 
direct relief supplies to areas where the prices for those goods 
were highest, presumably those areas where the demand for 
those goods are greatest.  This plan would have a number of 
important beneficial effects.   
First, it would encourage states to abandon artificially 
low price ceilings.  All things being equal, states with free post-
disaster markets are likely to have higher prices relative to 
states that have statutorily imposed price ceilings.  Some 
portion of discretionary disaster aid might be earmarked to 
respond to the price mechanism, that is, regions with higher 
prices could be considered to have demonstrated greater need 
for relief through increased supplies.  Under such a plan, states 
would have an incentive to let the price reflect the true demand 
for the good.  Any complaint by the states that, 
notwithstanding the low prices, there are few goods to sell at 
the posted prices would be an implicit admission that price 
ceilings tend to keep supplies low, and would perhaps play 
some role in educating the public of the relationship between 
price ceilings and shortages.  
In addition, the possibility of governmental competition 
will prevent suppliers who truly do possess monopoly power 
from pricing above the competitive level.  The fear of drawing 
in competition in the form of emergency relief will induce 
  
 200 See supra Part III.A. 
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suppliers to charge a lower price than might otherwise be 
charged.  Antitrust jurisprudence has long recognized the role 
that the threat of potential entry by a competitor has played in 
compelling monopolists to keep prices down.201  Responding to 
needs based on the price mechanism might also help 
consumers in situations where not even price gouging statutes 
can reach.  Most price gouging statutes only require that the 
post-disaster price be close to the pre-disaster price in the 
immediate market for the goods.  In situations where a 
monopolist was legally charging a monopoly price before the 
disaster, neither price gouging statutes nor antitrust law can 
address the needs of the affected consumers, yet those 
consumers are no less deserving of aid.  A price-based response 
is more likely to recognize and address such need.   
Finally, the price of goods might aggregate information 
better than other sources of information.202  Aid providers, 
much like any centrally planned system of distribution, face no 
small difficulty in determining who needs how much of what.  
Estimates are, at best, likely to be subject to a number of 
variables which may be quite difficult to predict.  Accordingly, 
the market price of emergency supplies, when adjusted for 
factors such as local income, might be the most efficient way to 
allocate scarce goods to those most in need of them. 
The basic goal of emergency relief should be to provide 
disaster victims with what they need as quickly as possible.  
Nothing in that mission statement implies that private, self-
interested market actions are likely to be any less effective at 
accomplishing those goals than traditional disaster response 
mechanisms.  Therefore, it is important to recognize that state 
laws which cripple the ability of the market to provide the 
goods buyers need by creating or exacerbating shortages are 
every bit as harmful as would be a law which hampered the 
ability of nonprofits and governments to respond to disasters.  
The needs of disaster victims can be met through both private, 
self-interested actors as well as through government and 
nonprofit responders.  It is therefore essential to rally against 
  
 201 See Posner, supra note 64, at 144 (“I have thus far assumed, with the 
Court, that the prospect of entry will actually affect the pricing decisions of the firms 
already in a market.”). 
 202 This is partially dependent on the ability of aid responders to accurately 
gauge prices. In most cases, this should present no significant difficulty, but the 
possibility that information will be difficult to gather illustrates why price-responsive 
relief should only be a part of a wider disaster response plan. 
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laws which artificially interfere with the operations of a well-
functioning market. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Legislators enact price gouging statutes as a response to 
their constituents’ anger and frustration at the high prices that 
follow a disaster.  High prices, however, may be less a 
reflection of the venality of suppliers than a natural market 
response to an imbalance between supply and demand.  
Instituting price ceilings serves only to exacerbate the 
shortages that lead to the high prices in the first place, and 
certainly can have no effect in reducing such shortages.   
Many buyers are understandably unhappy with the 
high prices they face in the wake of a natural disaster, but 
instituting price ceilings is not a reasonable remedy to the 
problem.  It is no doubt counterintuitive to many that fixing 
prices is likely to result in decreased availability of desired 
goods.  Economic theory and real world experience, however, 
demonstrate that this is precisely the case.  It will nonetheless 
remain difficult to convince the electorate of the wisdom of the 
economic approach, which is why it is so important to develop 
policy at the federal level to encourage the more rational 
approach.  As part of a comprehensive disaster response policy, 
the federal government should direct some portion of aid based 
on the price mechanism.  In doing so, legislators should 
recognize that they are not engaging in a mere social 
experiment, but are instead instituting an important policy 
that will result in a significant increase in material well-being 
for the victims of future catastrophes. 
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